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IN THE SUPREME COUR'r OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARILYN MANDARIHO OWEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant

Case No. 15330

-vsROBERT BALLARD OWEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BEIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appeal by the Plaintiff-Appellant from the decision of
Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying the Plaintiff-Appellant's Order to Show Cause to modify the 1973 Decree
of Divorce to increase child support payments.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The lower court entered its Order that there is no
substantial change in circumstances, since the Decree of
Divorce, established by Plaintiff-Appellant justifying a
modification of the Divorce Decree as to child support.
RELIEF ON APPEAL
Respondent requests this court affirm the judgment of the
lower court and that Appellant's request for attorney's fees
on appeal be denied.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Parties to this action were divorced in the Third
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on November
21, 1973, pursuant to the terms of a stipulation executed
between the parties on the 15th day of November, 1973,
(R. p.20).

The Decree of Divorce (R. p.25) provided that

Respondent was to pay the sum of One hundred dollars

($100.00)

per month per child, child support, for the use and benefit
of the two minor children of the parties

(R. p.26).

Further,

the Respondent was ordered to maintain heal th, life and accident

1

insurance policies on the children until they were eighteen
(18) years of age

(R. p. 27).

The Respondent has fully complied

with all the terms of the Divorce

De~ree

(Appellants Brief p.2), I

Respondent disagrees with Appellant's Brief (Appellants
Brief p.3) that certain facts are established by the testimony
given at the hearing.

I

Respondent submits to the court that

the following facts are established by the testimony and
pleadings on file in this action:

1.

Appellant claimed her monthly expenses have increased

by $432.33 per month (Tr. p.10).

There was no evidence

presented by the Appellant demonstrating which portion of her
alleged increase in living costs for normal monthly expenses
were attributable to the care, maintenance and support of the
minor children, excluding child care which has decreased by
$90.00 (R. p.35).
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I
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2.
per year

Appellant's income has increased from $4,200.00
(child support and alimony) in 1973; to $7,800.00

per year in 1976 (Tr. pp. 23-24) to $11,424.00 per year in
1977.

This figure is arrived at by computing Appellant's

income at the time the Order to Show Cause was filed, $752.00
per month, multiplied by 12 months, plus $2,400.00 per year
child support.

At the time the Order to Show Cause was filed

the Appellant was ne.tting $600. 00 per month plus $200. 00 per
nonth per child or a net annual income of $9,600.00 per year.
The Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her merit position with
the Utah State Auditor's office thirteen (13) days prior to
the Order to Show Cause hearing

(Tr. p.3, Tr. p.17), even

though her net income had increased 229% since the tine of the
divorce.
3.

Respondent's gross income increased from $1,162.00

($13,944.00 per year) in 1973 to $1,584.00 per month
($19,008.00 annually) in 1977 (Tr. pp. 24, 26).
4.

Respondant's net income increased from $888.69

at the time of the divorce to $1,121.10 at the time of the
hearing (Tr. p. 26), a net increase of 26%.
5.

Appellant's equity in the home awarded to her in

the divorce is, at a minimum, $25,000.00 after deducting the
contingent claim of $5,000.00 which Respondent has in the
event Appellant remarries or sells the home (Tr. p.22).
6.

At the time the Appellant suffered the injury

referred to in her brief she was receiving alimony.

At no
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time did she request an increase of that award (Tr. p.22).
Appellant represented in her affidavit filed in support of the
Order to Show Cause that she lost time from work as a result
of the injury.

She later admitted this was false.

She was

not working at that time (Tr. p.20).
7.

At the time of the divorce Appellant's Affidavit

did not state or acknowledge that she was receiving any support
or remuneration from her father whatsoever.

The Appellant

further testified that this undisclosed support terminated
approximately two years before the hearing on this Order to
Show Cause (Tr. p.7).
8.

Appellant testified she had been unable to purchase

clothes for her children, yet she purchased $375.00 worth
of clothes for herself in January of 1977 (Tr. p.18).
9.

Appellant incurred a $7,000.00 loan on January

i1, 1977 (Tr. p.18) and signed the Affidavit in Support of
the Order to Show Cause on the 26th day of February, 1977
(R. p. 36).
10.

The only item of furniture received by the .Respon-

dent at the time of the divorce was the kitchen table (Tr. p.23).
Appellant received all other furnishings and fixtures.

ii.

The testimony regarding the purported medical

and dental n.eeds of the children were admitted over counsel
for the Respondent's objection (Tr. p.13).

The need and

cost were complete hearsay and speculation.

i2.

After the divorce the Respondant could not afford
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an apartment of his own (Tr. p.9) and had to live with his
grandmother for a year to pay off the debts and obligations
incurred prior to the d~vorce.

In October of 1976, Respondent

purchased a condominium as his principal residence (Tr. p.30).
He borrowed the down payment from his mother (Tr. p.30),
and currently has an additional obligation of $6,500.00 to
the Utah State Credit Union.
13.

Since the time of the divorce Respondent has main-

tained medical insurance coverage for the children at all
times (Tr. p.17).
14.

Respondent's living expenses have gone up sub-

stantially more than those of the Appellant (R. p.52) including:
medical insurance for Respondent and his children inlcuding
current expenses directly related to the children as follows:
medical insurance for Respondent and his children $21.92 a
month; savings bonds for the children, $4.00 per month; child
support, $200.00 per month; children's clothing books etc.
$12.00 per month; Christmas and birthday gifts.
15.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found

no substantial change of circumstances proven by the Appellant
to justify a modification of the DIDvorce Decree.

Respondant

requested no modification of the Decree.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE HAS BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE APPELLANT'S
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CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY A MODIFICATION OF RESPONDANT'S
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION.
At the time of the parties' divorce in November of 1973
the Appellant claimed monthly expenses in the sum of $668.00
per month and income in the amount of $56. 00 per month (R. p.12),

f

The Appellant executed a stipulation that a Decree be entered

I

awarding her child support for two children in the smm of
$200.00 per month and $150.00 alimony for a period of 18 months.
This settlement was approximately $300.00 less than her stated
monthly expenses.

At the time of the divorce, the home of the

parties awarded to the Appellant was valued by her at $27 ,000.00
(R. p.12) which is now worth at least $53,000.00 (Tr. p.22).
Appellant's equity is at least $25,000.00.
Appellant's annual income for the year 1977, had she not
quit her job l3 days prior to the hearing in the court below,
would have been $ll,424.00 per year including the child support
payable by the Respondant.

Her net income for the year 1977,

including child support would have been $9,600.00 per year or
$800.00 per month net.

This constitutes a net increase of 229%

since the time of the divorce.
In

Noverr~er

of 1973 the Respondent had a net income of

$888.69 which increased to $l,121.10 (Tr. p.26); a net increase
of 26% before deducting child support payments.
At the hearing before Judge Hanson, neither Appellant nor
her counsel established, with any specificity, additional costs
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necessary for the health and well being of the children.

The

only specific costs presented by the Appellant were in regards
to speculative dental work.

This testimony was admitted over

objection of counsel for Respondent (Tr. p.13).

Admission of

this testimony constituted error in that it was speculative and
hearsay.
it.

No work was performed nor arrangements made to perform

It appears that Appellant doesn't know if, in fact, Respon-

dent is unwilling to assume these costs.

Appellant had not

discussed the orthodontic work with him "for awhile"

(Tr. p.20).

Appellant is attempting to modify the Decree because she
finds working a substantial, merit position distasteful (Tr. p.17).
Her alimony expired and she feels Respondent should support
her.
them.

Respondent dearly loves his children and willingly supports
He cannot and should not be subject to the Appellant's

irresponsibility,regarding her finances,to pay her additional
sums which she artfully claims the children need but are actually
for her personal use.
Appellant's brief states that she could not afford insurance (App. brief p.7) but the transcript reflects only that she
did not have insurance at the time of theiaccident.
testified that the burn received by her interfered

Appellant
with her

employment (Tr. p.9) but it is abundantly clear that her voluntary termination of her merit position with the State of Utah,
five (5)

days after

the signing of the Affidavit in Support

of Order to Show Cause, had nothing whatsoever to do with any
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I
I
prior injury, but was a voluntary decision on her part (Tr, p.11

:
1

There is no dispute that the Respondent has the duty and obli-

\

gation to provide support for the use and benefit of his minor

I

children.
Decree.

He has faithfully complied with this Order since the
There is

al~o

1

no question that the duty of support

is not the Respondent~ alone, 78-45-4 Utah Code Annotated
(1953 is amended 1957).
Appellant cites several cases in support of the proposition that inflationary trends are griounds to modify the Decree
of Divorce.

The issue before the court below was not inflation,

but whether or not Appellant presented sufficient evidence to
the court to establish a substantial change in circumstances
requiring additional support.

The evidence is clear that the

real substantial change in circumstances has been Appellent's
greater income.

Respondent makes no attempt in these proceedings,

to reduce the child support payable, recognizing he has an
obligation towards his children to assist in their support and
maintance.
The trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor I
of the witnesses at the hearing and was in a superior position
to judge the veracity and needs of the respective parties.
Afipellant relies on the case of Russell v. Russell 551
p.2d 231 (Utah 1976) to support the proposition that inflation
or increased age of children, in and of itself, is sufficient to'
justify increasing support.

In the Russell case the husband

-8-
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did not present any evi<lence as to his financial condition.
Respondent submitted all available information regarding his
financial status an<l, while it is conceded that his net income
has increased 26% since the time of divorce, his basic montlUy
expenses have also increased.

In

the Russell case, the decision

of the Court held that since the ex-husband chose not to pre 3 ent
any testimony regarding his current financial status it should
be presumed that he is capable of paying $160.00 a month for
his two minor children whereas, at the time of the divorce, he
was found able to pay $338.40 support for six children.
Appellant also contends that the case of Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974), holds that inflation and
the fact the children are older .ire sufficient grounds to justify
an increase in support.
Mitchell case.

Appellant badly misconstrues the

The Court found that the wife and the children

were in need of additional sums to support themselves. Because
the transcript was not submitted and this Court could not review
the record,

the district court decision was presumed valid and:

The burden is upon Appellant to prove that the evidence
clearly proponderates against the finding as made; or there
was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting
in substantial and prejudicial error; or a serious inequity
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion.
[Citing Harding v. Harding, 26 U. 2d 277, 48 P. 2d 308 (1971);
Searle v. Searle; 52-2 P. 2d 697 (Ut. 1974)], (P. 1360).
The decision of Judge Hanson is clearly supported by the
record.

The evidence preponderates to support Judge Hanson's

findings and the order entered by Judge Hanson,
objection by the Appellant

without

(R. p. 60), is in conformance with
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the aforementioned decision of this Court.
POINT II
THE ACTIONS OF THE APPELLANT SHOULD BAR HER FROM
OBTAINitlG EQUITABLE RELIEF.
This action is an attempt to obtain alimony under the
guise of child support.

It is submitted that a review of the

evidence and pleadings in this action requires the application
of the principal that "one who seeks equity must do it".
v. Sovey 29 U. 2d 294, 508 P. 2d 810 (1973).

Sovey

At the time of

the divorce, the Appellant submitted in her Affidavit (R. p.12)
that her monthly minimum expenses were $668.00.
that she had no other source of income.

She stated

The Appellant then

stipulated to the entry of the decree whereby the Respondent
was to pay her $350.00 per month.

At the time of the Order

to Show Cause hearing in June of 1977, the Appellant suddenly
materializes a previously undiscolsed source of income, her
father.

She testified he helped her financially

(Tr. p.16)

in an average amount of $250.00 per month up and until July,
1975, two years before the Order to Show Cause hearing.

The

Appellant filed a false affidavit at the time of the divorce
and falsly testified at the hearing.

She stated that during

the year 1973 and 1974 she had no income (Tr. p.23).

Further,

she stated that during the year 1975 she made $1,700.00 from
the real estate contract (Tr. p. 23

&

24).

She made no mention

of the sums attributed to her father, as income to her.
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In October of 1976 the Respondent, after several years
of careful, financial management, including living with his
grandmother for a year
divorce

to catch up on the bills from his

(Tr. p. 29) ,.purchased a condominium.

The indebtedness

assumed by the Respondent at the time of the divorce was
between $3,000.00 and $4,000.00 (Tr. p.29).

In October, 1976

the Respondent did not have

suffic~ent

payment on this residence.

He borrowed $2,600.00 from his

capital to make a dov.m

mother (Tr. p.30) and has reduced that obligation to $2,100.00.
He has owned this condominium for less than one year.

He also

owes the Utah State Credit Union $6,500.00.
The Appellant, apparently did not believe the Respondent
should be able to improve his living conditions.

Immediately

after Respondent purchased the condominium in October of 1976
the Appellant took steps to set up artificial grounds to substantiate her claim to modify the decree.

On January 17, 1977

Appellant instituted a loan of Seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00)
(Tr. p.l8).

Four thousand dollars

($4,000.00) was expended to

pay for her medical bills because she failed to carry medical
insurance. (Tr. p.18).

Another portion of the money was spent

to pay off obligations which the Respondent had co-signed
in an attempt to assist his ex-wife.

Appellant

also purchased

$350.00 to $400.00 worth of new clothes for herself (Tr. p.18),
and paid some house payments and heating bills.

Three weeks

after the Appellant obtained the loan, she signed the af·fidavi t
in support of her Order to Show cause (R. p.34).

-11-

On the second
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day of June, 1977, 13 days prior to the Order to Show Cause,
Appellant quit her job (Tr. p.17) where she had worked for more
than a year as a merit employee for the State of Utah.

She ther.

testified that her gross salary potential was $600.00 per
month (Tr. p.5) two weeks after she has quit a job in which
she grossed $752.00 per month.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT FOR
THE COURT TO MAKE ANY DETERMINATION AS TO THE PURPORTED
INCREASED NEEDS OF THE CHILDREN.
The Appellant chose to present evidence a-s to her general
cost of living (Tr. p. 11 and 16).

The evidence was insufficien•\

to substantiate any claim that the children are in need of in-

1

creased support from the Respondent.

Aside from the hypothetical

medical and dental expenses the Appellant failed to attribute
any of her purported expenses to the children with any specifici'.,
I

Respondent does not contend that child support payments must
be computed from specifically, proportioned needs of the childrer j
as compared to the family unit as a whole.

Appellant must estab-1

I
lish by competent testimony that there is, l . )

a real and

actual need by the children for additional support and 2.)
~he

nature and extent of that need.

The Appellant failed to

establish either condition.
The fact that the Appellant claims her car is run down
(Tr. p.14); she doesn't bother to do her yard work (Tr. p.14);
there are four windows which do not have drapes and did not have
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at the time of the divorce (Tr. p.14); gasoline costs have
increased (Tr. p.11) and she requires more expensive clothing
(Tr. p.11) are not relevant to the issues before Court.

The

purported medical and dental needs of the children, admitted
over counsels' objection, are single expenditures.

It is

interesting to know that Appellant did not request the court
order that the Respondent assist her in these expenses.

Rather,

Appellant attempted to utilize this evidence to support an
increase in Respondent~ continuing support duty rather than
have the Respondent aid her in these extraordinary expenses if
and when they are ever incurred.

There was never any evidence

submitted to the increased costs to support the children themselves.

Without more specific costs of the increased needs of

the children any decision which the court would have made

woul~

have been purely speculative and a clear abuse of discretion.
The court was unable to determine that the children, and not
the Appellant, needed additional funds.
POINT IV
RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO PAY THE APPELLANT'S
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL.
Appellant has set forth in her brief (Appellant's brief
page 12) that the Respondent: " ***has refused to adequately
assist in supporting such children".
false.

This allegation is absolutely

The Respondent has timely and fully complied \-ti th the

Divorce Decree.

He dearly loves his children and willingly
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contributes to their support and maintenance.

It is unjust

that the Respondent be ordered to support the Appellant's
calculated and artificial attempt to obtain alimony under the
guise· of child support.

The Appellant was denied attorney's

fees in the court below and should be denied such fees on
appeal.

CONCLUSION
Respondent requests the decision of the lower court be
affirmed.

The substantial change in circumstances was not

established by the Appellant.

Appellant's income has risen

substantially more than that of the Respondent.

She has man-

ipulated her income and needs to present a destitute picture.
Upon examination, this picture reveals a woman with excellent
employment but with grandiose expectations.

The Appellant

quits her job and requests additional child support.
is not child support.

The issue

The Appellant has failed to demonstrate

any increased needs of the children with reasonable certainty.
She simply decided that she did not like working and looked to
the Respondent to pick up the slack.

The Respondent has worked

for the last several years to re-establish his own security.
He has done this in conjunction with his obligation to assist
his children not in spite of that responsibility.
The only substantial change of circumstances that has
occured since the divorce is that the Appellant's net income
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has increased 229% since the time of the divorce.

Respondent's

income has increased 26% since the time of the divorce but
that increase has been totally absorbed by his increased
housing needs.

Respondent should not have to bow to the whims

and caprices of the Appellant which she establishes for her
own benefit, not those of the children.
Respectfully submitted,

Robert Felton
Attorney for Defendant
Twelve Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
CERI'IFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing Brief of.Respondent by delivering
two copies thereof, personally, to Joseph L. Henriod or Bruce
J, Nelson, Attorney for Appellant at 410 Newhouse Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84lll, this

15f-

D-ec

day of November, 1977.
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